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2Abstract
This paper re-examines the empirical evidence on the price puzzle and proposes a new theoretical
interpretation. Using structural VARs and two different identiﬁcation strategies based on zero
restrictions and sign restrictions, we ﬁnd that the positive response of prices to a monetary policy
shock is historically limited to the subsamples associated with a weak central bank response to
inﬂation. These subsamples correspond to the pre-Volcker period for the United States and the
period prior to the introduction of the inﬂation targeting framework for the United Kingdom.
U s i n gam i c r o - f o u n d e dN e wK e y n e s i a nm o n e t a ry policy model for the US economy, we then
show that the structural VARs are capable of reproducing the price puzzle from artiﬁcial data only
when monetary policy is passive and hence multiple equilibria arise. In contrast, this model never
generates on impact a positive inﬂation response to a policy shock. The omission in the VARs of a
variable capturing the high persistence of expected inﬂation under indeterminacy is found to
account for the price puzzle observed in actual data.
Key words: Price puzzle, DSGE model, Taylor principle, indeterminacy, SVARs.
JEL classiﬁcation: E30, E52.
3Summary
The initial positive response of prices to a contractionary monetary policy shock is a stylised fact
of most empirical studies measuring the effects of monetary policy on the aggregate economy.
This behaviour is often referred to as ‘puzzling’ because macroeconomic models either cannot
explain it theoretically (eg a standard sticky-price model) or, even when capable of explaining it in
principle, they do not produce a positive price response empirically (eg models of the cost channel
transmission of monetary policy).
T h ep r e s e n c eo fap r i c ep u z z l ei si m p o r t a n tb e c a use it casts serious doubts on the possibility of
correctly identifying a monetary policy shock. If the central bank monitors and responds to a
larger information set than that of the econometrician, what may be referred to as a policy shock
by the latter is actually a combination of a genuine policy shock and some endogenous policy
reactions. The result of this omission is that a policy tightening in anticipation of future inﬂation
could be wrongly interpreted by the econometrician as a policy shock, delivering a spurious
correlation between a tighteni n go fp o l i c ya n dar i s ei ni n ﬂation: the price puzzle.
In a speech as Fed Governor, Bernanke offered a new interpretation of the mis-identiﬁcation of
structural shocks. He noted that ‘[...] changes in inﬂation expectations, which are ultimately the
product of the monetary policy regime, can also be confused with truly exogenous shocks in
conventional econometric analysis. [...] insufﬁciently anchored inﬂation expectations have led to
periodic ‘inﬂation scares’, in which inﬂation expectations have risen in an apparently autonomous
manner. Increases in inﬂation expectations have the ﬂavor of adverse aggregate supply shocks in
that they tend to increase the volatility of both inﬂation and output, in a combination that depends
on how strongly the monetary policy makers actt oo f f s e tt h e s ec h a n g e si ne x p e c t a t i o n s ’.
This paper offers a theoretically and empirically consistent explanation for the price puzzle using
a micro-founded New Keynesian model and structural vector autoregressions (VARs). A major
contribution is to show that the price puzzle has been historically a feature of speciﬁc monetary
policy regimes. These regimes are the period prior to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed
Chairman in August 1979 for the United States and the period prior to the introduction of the
inﬂation-targeting regime in 1992 for the United Kingdom. This result is robust to using two
different identiﬁcation strategies, as well as augmenting the VARs with unit labour costs and a
4commodity price index. Moreover, the subsample evidence on the price puzzle is found to be
independent from using real GDP, detrended output, the output gap or output growth as a measure
of real activity.
A wide number of contributions to the empirical literature on monetary policy rules ﬁnds that a
shift in the conduct of monetary policy occurred at the end of 1979 in the United States and at the
end of 1992 in the United Kingdom. We therefore investigate the link between these shifts in the
conduct of policy and our results about the price puzzle, modelling monetary policy using simple
mechanical rules. It should be emphasised that this paper does not suggest that monetary policy in
the United States and United Kingdom was in fact conducted using these mechanic policy rules:
rather, they are simply a useful empirical representation of monetary policy.
A sticky price model is calibrated to the magnitude of the historical shift in the conduct of US
monetary policy. This model is used to simulate artiﬁcial data and then the structural VARs are
estimated on the artiﬁcial data. A main ﬁnding is that only when the central bank does not raise
the interest rate sufﬁciently in response to inﬂation (and thus inﬂation expectations are not well
anchored in the theoretical model) do the structural VARs estimated on the artiﬁcial data generate
a sizable price puzzle. In contrast, the theoretical model is not capable of generating an initial
positive response of the price level to a monetary policy shock, even when the nominal interest
rate responds less than fully to inﬂation.
Our results suggest that the pri c ep u z z l ei si nf a c ta na r t i ﬁcial result that arises from expected
inﬂation being omitted from the VAR. Expected inﬂation is remarkably more persistent when
expectations are not fully stabilised by the monetary policy. Furthermore, such omitted variable
bias is found to account for the apparently puzzling response of inﬂa t i o nt oap o l i c ys h o c k
observed on actual data, consistently with Bernanke’s argument.
Our results suggest that when the policy framework does not mandate sufﬁcient response to
inﬂation, the behaviour of private sector expectations gives rise to perverse dynamics, like inﬂation
persistence and the price puzzle, that are not necessarily intrinsic characteristics of the economy.
51 Introduction
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) are widely used to measure and understand the effects
of monetary policy innovations on the aggregate economy. The empirical validity of these
assessments relies on the selection of a plausible identiﬁcation scheme, which requires to
imposing an appropriate number of restrictions on the relationships among the variables of the
empirical model. The contemporaneous zero restrictions used by Sims (1992) and popularised by
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) is, for instance, a typical identiﬁcation strategy to
isolate the effects of a policy shock. This identiﬁcation hinges upon the assumption that the policy
instrument reacts contemporaneously to inﬂation and output, while inﬂation and output respond to
the policy instrument only with lags.
While most results in the VAR literature are consistent with economic intuition and
macroeconomic theory, the typically found positive reaction of the price level on impact to a
monetary policy shock is a fact that most monetary models have difﬁculty in explaining. This
anomaly, ﬁrst noted by Sims (1992) and labelled ‘the price puzzle’ by Eichenbaum (1992), seems
to cast serious doubt on the possibility of correctly identifying a monetary policy shock by VAR
econometricians. If the central bank monitors and responds to a larger information set than that of
the VAR, what is referred to as a policy shock is actually a combination of a genuine policy shock
and some endogenous policy reactions.
Sims (1992) argues that the central bank may have more information about future inﬂa t i o nt h a na
simple VAR could adequately capture. The result of this omission is that a policy tightening in
anticipation of future inﬂation would be wrongly interpreted by the econometrician as a policy
shock. As long as the monetary policy response only partially offsets the inﬂationary pressure, the
VAR would therefore deliver a spurious correlation between a tightening of policy and a rise of
inﬂation, namely the price puzzle. Sims (1992) observes that the inclusion of a commodity price
index in the VAR seems to capture enough additional information about future inﬂation as to
possibly solve the puzzle.
In a recent speech as Fed Governor, Bernanke (2004) offered a new interpretation of the
hypothesis of mis-identiﬁcation of the structural shocks conjecturing that:
6‘[...] changes in inﬂation expectations, which are ultimately the product of the
monetary policy regime, cana l s ob ec o n f u s e dw i t ht r u l ye x o g e n o u ss h o c k si n
conventional econometric analysis. Marvin Goodfriend (1993) has suggested, for
example, that insufﬁciently anchored inﬂation expectations have led to periodic
‘inﬂation scares’, in which inﬂa t i o ne x p e c t a t i o n sh a v er i s e ni na na p p a r e n t l y
autonomous manner. Increases in inﬂation expectations have the ﬂavor of adverse
aggregate supply shocks in that they tend to increase the volatility of both inﬂation
and output, in a combination that depends on how strongly the monetary policy
makers act to offset these changes in expectations.’ (1)
This paper offers a theoretically and empirically consistent explanation for the price puzzle using
a micro-founded New Keynesian model and structural VARs. A major contribution is to show that
the price puzzle has been historically a distinctive feature of speciﬁc monetary policy regimes.
These regimes are the period prior to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in August
1979 for the United States, and the period prior to the introduction of the inﬂation-targeting
framework in 1992 for the United Kingdom. This result is robust to the use of two different
identiﬁcation strategies based on recursive zero restrictions and sign restrictions as well as when
the VARs are augmented with unit labour costs, a commodity price index, and M2. Moreover, the
subsample evidence on the price puzzle is found to be independent from using real GDP,
detrended output, the output gap or output growth as a measure of real activity.
A wide number of contributions to the empirical literature on monetary policy rules ﬁnds that a
shift in the conduct of monetary policy occurred at the end of 1979 in the United States (Clarida,
Galí and Gertler (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Cogley and
Sargent (2005) among others) and at the end of 1992 in the United Kingdom (Nelson (2003)).(2)
We therefore investigate the correlation between the empirical result of this literature about
monetary policy and the empirical ﬁnding of this paper about the price puzzle.(3)
Using a New Keynesian sticky price model of the US economy as data generating process, we
show that structural VARs on artiﬁcial data, based on either zero restrictions or model consistent
(1) It should be noted that Bernanke (2004) refers to Goodfriend’s argument of ‘insufﬁciently anchored inﬂation
expectations’ in the context of the ‘Great Moderation’ deﬁned as the sizable decline of output and inﬂation variability
observed moving from the 1970s and very early 1980s to the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s. In the original paper
however Goodfriend (1993) refers to the very end of the 1970s and very early 1980s only.
(2) It is not suggested however that monetary policy in the United States and United Kingdom was in fact conducted
by reference to such rules, rather they are simply a useful empirical representation of monetary policy.
(3) This view is not however uncontroversial and several authors including Sims and Zha (2005), and Canova,
Gambetti and Pappa (2005) do not ﬁnd much instability in postwar US monetary policy. We come back to this issue in
Section 4.3 and discuss the extent to which neglecting indeterminacy can reconcile these apparently conﬂicting results.
7sign restrictions, are capable of reproducing the price puzzle only when the central bank does not
raise the interest rate sufﬁciently in response to inﬂation and thus multiple equilibria arise. In
contrast, the New Keynesian model is not capable of generating on impact a positive response of
the price level to a monetary policy shock even when monetary policy is passive.(4) Another main
contribution of the paper is to show that the price puzzle can actually be a spurious correlation
induced by the omission in the VAR of a variable capturing the persistence of expected inﬂation,
which is remarkably higher under indeterminacy.
The indeterminacy induced omitted variable bias is found to account quantitatively for the
apparently puzzling response of inﬂation to a policy shock observed on actual data. Interestingly,
our results show that the arguments in Sims (1992) and Bernanke (2004) are supported in the
context of a structural model only when monetary policy is passive and thus multiple equilibria
arise. Furthermore, our results suggest that when the policy framework does not mandate
sufﬁcient response to inﬂation pressures, the behaviour of private sector expectations gives rise to
perverse dynamics, like inﬂation persistence and the price puzzle, that are not necessarily intrinsic
characteristics of the economy.
It is worth noticing that since the seminal paper by Sims (1992) and the comment by Eichenbaum
(1992), several important recent contributions including Hanson (2004), Giordani (2004) and
Leeper and Roush (2003) have advanced our knowledge on the timing and characteristics of the
price puzzle. These contributions however are mainly empirical and they are all focused
exclusively on the United States. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to
rationalise the price puzzle using a structural model and it is also the ﬁrst contribution
documenting that the price puzzle is a feature of the pre-1992 monetary policy frameworks in the
United Kingdom.(5)
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a re-examination of the empirical evidence
using, among other (augmented) speciﬁcations, estimated SVARs in output, inﬂation and the
(4) Following the literature, monetary policy is deﬁned as ‘active’ (‘passive’) when the nominal interest rate is moved
more (less) than proportionally in response to movements in inﬂation.
(5) The cost channel and the interaction of active ﬁscal policy and passive monetary policy could also, in principle,
contribute to the subsample evidence on the price puzzle. At the empirical level however, Rabanal (2004) estimates on
US aggegate data a DSGE sticky price model augmented with a cost channel and shows that the estimated model is
not capable of generating a price puzzle. Lubik (2005) tests for indeterminacy in a DSGE sticky price model that
explicitly incorporates ﬁscal policy and cannot reject the hypothesis that the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy
in the United States prior to 1979 resulted in an indeterminate equilibrium.
8nominal interest rate. The following section describes the New Keynesian sticky price model used
for the theoretical investigation. In Section 4, the dynamic responses of the theoretical model to a
monetary policy shock are compared to the impulse responses of the structural VARs estimated on
artiﬁcial data. When the model is simulated under indeterminacy, the latter are shown to be quite
different with respect to the former, and reproduce the sign and magnitude of the price puzzle
observed over the pre-1979 subsample. The results from a hybrid version of the New Keynesian
model are also presented. Section 5 offers a new interpretation of the price puzzle and shows that
augmenting the SVAR on actual data with the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation forecasts reduces
signiﬁcantly the omitted variable bias that would otherwise emerge. Conclusions are presented in
the last section. The source of the data and the construction of the variables are detailed in the data
appendix while the last appendix outlines the method by Sims (2001) and the identiﬁcation
strategy proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003, 2004) to solve the model under indeterminacy.
2 A re-examination of the empirical evidence
This section reconsiders the empirical evidence from the VAR literature and shows that the price
p u z z l ei sasubsample phenomenon. In particular, a positive response of inﬂa t i o nt oa ni n t e r e s tr a t e
structural innovation is an outstanding feature of the periods that, in the empirical literature on
monetary policy rules, are typically associated with a weak interest rate reaction to inﬂation. This
result appears robust to several modiﬁcations in the VAR, and is independent of using real GDP or
the output gap as a measure of real activity.(6)
2.1 Identiﬁcation through zero restrictions
The n-variables VAR has the following structural representation
AYt = B(L)Yt−1 + ut (1)
where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables and A is the matrix of the contemporaneous
relationships. B(L) represents the lag-structure (from lag 1 to lag p), and ut is the vector of






(6) As the output gap can be measured according to several statistical criteria, it is important to check the robustness
of our ﬁndings to different empirical deﬁnitions. Our results are robust to using a fairly broad range of output gap
measures which have been proposed in the literature.
9The structural VAR can be written in reduced form as
Yt = C(L)Yt−1 + vt
where the elements of the matrices C are convolutions of the elements in the matrix A and the
elements in the matrices B. The reduced-form residuals are stacked in the vector vt = A−1ut and








To identify the monetary policy shock, we adopt the recursive scheme put forward by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and impose n (n − 1)/2 zero restrictions on the matrix of
contemporaneous relationships A. This corresponds to employing a Cholesky factorisation of the
variance-covariance matrix estimated from the unrestricted VAR such that   A−1  A−1
 
=    
.
With a lower-triangular structure, the ordering Yt =
 
yt,πt, Rt
   implies that the measure of real
activity, yt, is the most exogenous variable, the measure of inﬂation, πt, can respond
contemporaneously to real activity only, whereas the instrument of monetary policy, Rt,c a n
respond contemporaneously both to inﬂation and to real activity. The last equation in the structural
VAR is interpreted as a contemporaneous policy rule. The model is just-identiﬁed.
2.2 Full-sample impulse response functions (IRFs)
We consider US quarterly data for the period 1966 Q1-2002 Q4.(7) The beginning of the sample
corresponds to the date when the federal funds rate was ﬁrst traded consistently above the discount
rate. The results below are robust to beginning the ﬁrst subsample in the ﬁrst quarter of 1960 and
the second subsample begin in the fourth quarter of 1982, which corresponds to the end of
Volcker’s experiment on non-borrowed reserves targeting. The ﬁrst set of impulse responses use
real GDP as a measure of activity. The baseline measure of inﬂation is the (annualised) change in
the GDP deﬂator while the policy instrument is the federal funds rate.
Figure 1 plots the impulse response functions of the three variables to a monetary policy
tightening obtained from the estimates of the recursive VAR outlined in the previous section.(8)
The middle panel shows the price puzzle. After a monetary policy shock, the price level moves
(7) A detailed description of the data can be found in the data appendix.
(8) The number of lags in the VARs is chosen throughout the paper according to standard lag length criteria. The
results are robust to keeping the number of lags ﬁxed across subsamples.
10upward such as to imply a positive and prolonged increase in inﬂation. In contrast, the responses
of the federal funds rate and the output level appear in line with the predictions of theory. The
zeros on impact are imposed in the identiﬁcation.
The 95% conﬁdence bands of the inﬂation reaction do include zero. The analysis below will show,
however, that the price puzzle is indeed very signiﬁcant over the subsample associated with a
weak central bank response to inﬂation. For the time being, it is worth emphasising not only that
the qualitative pattern of inﬂation in Figure 1 is counterintuitive but also that many
macroeconomic models have serious difﬁculties in explaining it. This paper reconciles theory and
empirics using a New Keynesian monetary model. As theory suggests that the output gap rather
than the level of output should be used as a measure of real activity, the analysis below will also
consider VARs that include the output gap.(9)
2.3 The subsample stylised fact
This section recasts the discussion on the price puzzle in terms of monetary policy shifts and asks
whether the change in the conduct of US monetary policy that Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000),
Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Cogley and Sargent (2005),
among others, date to the end of the 1970s, is correlated with the evidence on the price puzzle. To
investigate this possibility, we follow earlier contributions and split the sample in the third quarter
of 1979 when Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve and ﬁghting inﬂation became a clear policy objective. We use the same variables and
identiﬁcation scheme of the previous section and compute the impulse response functions (IRFs)
from the restricted VAR over the two subsamples.
Figure 2 shows that the price puzzle is signiﬁcant and sizable during the pre-Volcker period only.
The reactions of all variables to the policy shock appear far larger than in the full-sample analysis.
In particular, the inﬂation rate peaks at 57 basis points, while in Figure 1 the peak does not go
further than 16 basis points. After seven quarters the inﬂation rate becomes negative implying that
the price level reverses its path. Turning to the post-Volcker regime, 1979 Q4-2002 Q4 in the
bottom panel, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of a price puzzle in that the inﬂation reaction to a
(9) As the output gap can be measured according to several statistical criteria, it is important to check the robustness
of our ﬁndings to different empirical deﬁnitions. Our results are robust to using a fairly broad range of output gap
measures which have been proposed in the literature.
11policy shock is negative on impact and then fades away fairly quickly, far from being statistically
relevant.(10)
Figures 1 and 2 are based on tri-variate SVARs embedding the real GDP. As Giordani (2004)
emphasises however, the macroeconomic theory predicts that the output gap rather than the level
of output should enter a VAR designed for monetary policy analysis. We take this point seriously
and estimate a tri-variate VAR in the output gap, inﬂation and nominal interest rate using the
recursive identiﬁcation scheme outlined above. The output gap xt is deﬁned as the percentage
deviation of output yt from its potential level y∗
t . In turn, we consider three different measures of
potential output that correspond to: i) the estimates of the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO); ii)
the HP-ﬁlter trend; and iii) a quadratic trend.(11) Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses of
inﬂation to a monetary policy shock. The other IRFs, omitted for brevity and available upon
request, show patterns consistent with the theory.
Immediately, we see that the presence of the output gap does not affect the subsample evidence.
The reaction of the inﬂation rate is quite similar across different output gap deﬁnitions, and it is
also very similar to the impulse response shown in Figure 2. The evidence in favour of the price
puzzle is statistically relevant only before 1979 in spite of the fact that the measure of real activity
is now the output gap. The response of inﬂation peaks after a few periods and it is now larger than
in the full-sample analysis reported in Figure 1. In contrast, the price puzzle disappears after 1979.
Using the growth rate of real GDP as measure of real activity or using the consumer prices index
(CPI) as measure of inﬂation gives results, not reported but available upon request, which are
fairly similar.
Further empirical support for the relationship between the price puzzle and the monetary policy
framework can also be found in Boivin and Giannoni (2002), who report an interesting
counterfactual exercise using a structural VAR in inﬂation, output and interest rate. When the
policy rule estimated over the post-1979 sample is super-imposed on the estimates of the inﬂation
and output equations before 1979, the price puzzle disappears. In contrast, the monetary policy of
(10)Similar results are obtained by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) using a recursive identiﬁcation and
monthly data, and by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) using a recursive factor-augmented VAR and quarterly data.
However, these papers mainly focus on the assessment of the monetary policy effectiveness rather than on the source
and interpretation of the price puzzle.
(11)The HP ﬁlter is two-sided and so produces a smoothed series of output that may lead to inconsistent estimates.
Other studies however employ this cyclical measure and for the sake of comparison we also report the IRFs using the
deviations of output from an HP and a quadratic trend.
12the 1960s and 1970s combined with the structure of the economy of the 1980s and 1990s does
generate a sizable price puzzle.
2.4 Robustness analysis
This section investigates the robustness of our results to using a four-variate and a ﬁve-variate
SVAR. The expanded vector of endogenous variable is given by   Yt =
 
zt, yt,πt, Rt
   where zt
contains the additional variable(s). Figure 4 presents the inﬂation response to a monetary policy
shock under four different speciﬁcations of the vector   Yt.T h eﬁrst column augments the tri-variate
VAR in federal funds rate, inﬂation and real activity with a measure of real unit labour costs as
suggested by the theory and by the empirical analysis in Sbordone (2002).(12) The second column
uses the changes in the production price index (PPI: Industrial Commodities) as the fourth
variable of the VAR in the spirit of Sims (1992), while the third column assesses the ability of M2
growth to lead future inﬂation in the context of the non-recursive identiﬁcation strategy proposed
by Leeper and Roush (2003).(13) The last column presents the results from a speciﬁcation
advocated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) which consists of a ﬁve-variate VAR in
PPI inﬂation, real GDP, inﬂation, federal funds rate and M2g r o w t h .
All impulse response functions in Figure 4 reveal that the data still favour the hypothesis that the
price puzzle is limited to the pre-1979 subsample. As in the previous ﬁgures, the puzzle is
quantitatively important and statistically relevant for all speciﬁcations, though the estimates for
the four-variate VAR with M2 growth are somewhat less precise. It is worth emphasising that the
standard practice of including the production price index to solve the price puzzle, as shown in the
second and last columns, does not overturn the subsample evidence.(14)
(12)Our results are also robust to the use of capacity utilisation as a measure of the business cycle.
(13)Very similar ﬁndings are obtained replacing M2t growth with the level of M2t or with a measure of real
balances, M2t/Pt where Pt is the GDP deﬂator at time t. The price puzzle becomes even larger over the pre-1979
subsample using two alternative recursive identiﬁcations in which money is the most exogenous and then the most
endogenous variable in the VAR.
(14)Our results are robust also to using the log of PPI, the oil price index of the Wall Street Journal,t h eP P I :C r u d e
Fuel, and the PPI: Crude Materials. Similar ﬁndings are reported in Fuhrer (2000) and extensively commented in
Hanson (2004).
132.5 An alternative identiﬁcation strategy based on sign restrictions
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the results based on contemporaneous zero restrictions
to using an alternative identiﬁcation scheme based on sign restrictions. The technical
implementation of this alternative strategy is already offered in several papers in the literature and
will not be repeated here (see Peersman (2005) and the references therein).
In line with the theoretical model used below, a monetary policy shock has a non-negative impact
on the interest rate and a non-positive effect on the output gap. It is worth emphasising that unlike
previous contributions, which rule out the price puzzle by assuming a non positive inﬂation
response to a monetary policy shock, we deliberately leave the inﬂation response unconstrained in
an effort to investigate and document the subsample regularity associated with the price puzzle.
The effects of supply and demand shocks are consistent with a typical aggregate demand and
aggregate supply diagram: a supply (demand) disturbance has a non-negative (non-negative) effect
on the interest rate and inﬂation, and a non-positive (non-negative) effect on the output gap.
Following Peersman (2005), the restrictions on the interest rate are imposed over the
contemporaneous reactionw h e r e a st h er e s t r i c t i o n so nt h er e s p o n s e so fi n ﬂation and output are
imposed for, but not limited to, the ﬁrst four periods.
The choice of identifying supply and demand disturbances in addition to the monetary policy
shock, while not crucial for the results, is twofold. First, we want to make sure that the matrix of
contemporaneous parameters, which also identiﬁes the policy shock, does not produce responses
of inﬂation, output and interest rate to other types of shocks inconsistent with economic intuition
and theory. Second, we wish to impose most of the sign restrictions implied by a typical New
Keynesian sticky price model because this is the vehicle used in Section 4 to show that the price
puzzle is the artiﬁce of an omitted variable bias. The qualitative results are not affected by varying
these numbers.
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses of the output gap, inﬂation and the interest rate to a
monetary policy shock. The price puzzle conﬁrms itself as an empirical regularity associated with
the pre-1979 subsample. Relaxing the contemporaneous zero restrictions actually ampliﬁes the
puzzle in that the inﬂation response now becomes positive also on impact. Furthermore, following
14a policy shock inﬂation declines on impact over the post-1979 subsample with monetary policy
having a sizable effect on all variables.
2.6 Evidence for the United Kingdom
The link between a monetary policy regime and the evidence on the price puzzle does not seem
limited to the United States. While an international investigation is beyond the scope of this paper,
we employ a tri-variate recursive VAR using data for the UK economy before and after the
introduction of the inﬂation-targeting regime in the fourth quarter of 1992. The sample starts in
1979 Q2 when the Thatcher government was ﬁrst elected and moved towards a more active use of
the interest rate to control inﬂation. Additionally, the data on the UK labour market, including unit
labour costs, began to be systematically collected and published only in 1979 with the
establishment of the Labour Force Survey.
Figure 6 compares the impulse responses of inﬂa t i o nt oam o n e t a r yp o l i cy shock using real GDP,
HP-ﬁltered and quadratically detrended output as measure of real activity, and the change in GDP
deﬂator and CPI as measures of inﬂation, respectively. The instrument is the Bank of England
policy rate.(15) The top panel shows that only the pre-1992 estimates are associated with a large
and robust price puzzle, although this is not statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, the
inﬂation-targeting framework is characterised by a few dynamics and the price puzzle is no longer
present. The positive inﬂation response, which emerges now only for a few quarters, is quite small
relative to the IRFs in the top panel.
The hypothesis of a relationship between the price puzzle and the monetary policy regime is
consistent with the evidence in Nelson (2003) who ﬁnds that the pre and post-1992 periods are
characterised by a marked difference in the monetary policy stance: the nominal interest rate has
been raised more than proportionally in response to inﬂation only since 1992.(16)
In summary, Figures 1 to 6 identify a new stylised fact. The VAR evidence of a positive reaction
of inﬂa t i o no ni m p a c tt oam o n e t a r yp o licy shock is limited to speciﬁc historical periods. These
(15)Similar results are obtained using the three-month Treasury bill rate, which has historically moved quite closely
with the policy interest rates used by the UK monetary authorities since 1979. The correlation between the repo rate
and the three-month Treasury bill rate is 0.97.
(16)As the paper focuses on monetary policy, we abstract from ﬁscal policy considerations which may also have
contributed to the inﬂation outcomes of the 1980s in the United Kingdom.
15are the pre-Volcker sample for the United States and the period before inﬂation targeting was
adopted in the United Kingdom. The dating of this stylised fact calls for a new explanation of the
price puzzle. Our hypothesis is that most of the apparent price puzzle comes from the
(mis)identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock during the regimes associated with a weak
response of interest rate to inﬂation. The rest of the paper investigates this hypothesis using a
standard New Keynesian sticky price model.
3 A framework for monetary policy analysis
This section describes a log-linearised, micro-founded New Keynesian sticky price model of the
business cycle of the kind popularised by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), King (2000) and
Woodford (2003) among others. This model consists of the following three aggregate
relationships:
xt = Etxt+1 − τ(Rt − Etπt+1) + gt (2)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (xt − zt) (3)
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1 − ρR)(ψππt + ψxxt) + εR,t (4)
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where xt is deﬁned as the deviation of output from its trend-path, πt represents inﬂation, and Rt is
the nominal interest rate. Inﬂation and the interest rate are expressed in percentage deviations
from their steady-state values.
Equation (2) is a log-linearised IS curve stemming from the household’s intertemporal problem in
which consumption and bond holdings are the control variables and τ represents the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. There is no physical capital in this economy and therefore consumption
is proportional to total resources up to an exogenous process gt. The latter is typically interpreted
as a government spending shock or a preferences shock.(17)
Equation (3) captures the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world in which each ﬁrm adjusts its
price with a constant probability in any given period, and independently from the time elapsed
(17)Notice that the IS curve can be easily reinterpreted as a schedule explaining the behavior of the ‘output gap’
deﬁned as the difference between the stochastic components of output and the ﬂexible price level of output (see
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999)). In this case, the shock gt is also a function of potential output variations.
16from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price-setting creates an incentive to adjust prices
more the higher is the future inﬂation expected at time t.T h ep a r a m e t e r0<β<1 is the agents’
discount factor while κ, which is the inverse of the sacriﬁce ratio, relates the difference between
the output deviation from a long-run trend, xt, to the contemporaneous rate of inﬂation πt.
Equation (4) characterises the behaviour of the monetary authorities. This is an interest rate rule
according to which the central bank adjusts the policy rate in response to inﬂation and the output
gap. These adjustments are implemented smoothly, with ρR measuring the degree of interest rate
smoothing. The random variable εR stands for the monetary policy shock, which can be
interpreted either as unexpected deviations from the policy rule or as policy mistakes.
There is no correlation between innovations and their variance-covariance matrix is described in
equation (5). Furthermore, all shocks hitting the economy are white noise. The last assumption
has been deliberately designed to make transparent the effect of indeterminacy on the persistence
of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. Allowing for an autoregressive process for zt does not alter
our conclusions.
4 Impulse response functions analysis
In this section, we investigate whether the small-scale New Keynesian monetary model detailed
above is capable of reproducing the price puzzle. The model is parameterised using the estimates
in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). We employ the same structural VAR on two data sets generated
under indeterminacy and determinacy. The procedure in the simulations is as follows:
1. Solve the model under both indeterminacy and determinacy, and generate two data sets of 55
a n d9 3o b s e r v a t i o n si n c l uding the output gap, inﬂation and interest rate.(18)
2. For each solution, estimate a reduced-form tri-variate VAR on the artiﬁcial data and impose the
same identiﬁcation strategies adopted in the empirical analysis.
3. Compute the responses of the variables to a structural innovation in the interest rate equation.
4. Repeat steps (1) to (3) 10,000 times and for each parameterisation select the median structural
(18)The number of observations has been chosen to match the quarterly data points available from 1966 Q1 to 1979
Q3 and from 1979 Q4 to 2002 Q4, respectively. In each simulated sample, 100 extra-observations are produced to
provide us with a stochastic vector of initial conditions, and then are discarded.
17IRFs.(19)
To the extent that indeterminacy can explain the price puzzle, the SVARs using the data simulated
under indeterminacy should reproduce, at least qualitatively, the stylised fact, and possibly
generate structural IRFs which are within the empirical 95% conﬁdence bands shown in Section 2.
On the other hand, the SVARs using the data simulated under determinacy should not produce any
puzzling response.
4.1 Parameterisation
In order to implement step 1 and check the robustness of our results to different parameterisations,
we use two sets of estimates for the New Keynesian model presented in Section 3. These values
are reported in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) for the US economy over some pre and post-Volcker
samples. The only difference relative to their model is that our speciﬁcation intentionally lacks
any endogenous or exogenous persistence in the inﬂation and output process. This choice reﬂects
the attempt to evaluate the ability of a quite forward-looking model to generate persistence under
indeterminacy.
To focus on the importance of a change in monetary policy, we keep all structural parameters of
the model ﬁxed across simulations with the exception of the coefﬁcients in the interest rate
equation. The ﬁrst (second) artiﬁcial data set corresponds to the pre-1979 (post-1979) estimates of
the reaction function. In doing so, any difference in the structural IRFs estimated on the artiﬁcial
data sets can only be due to the variation in theT a y l o rr u l e .T a b l e1r e p o r t st h ev a l u e so ft h e
parameters of the model.(20)
It is worth noting that the interest rate response to inﬂation in the second and third columns does
not guarantee a unique RE equilibrium because both ψπ = 0.77 and ψπ = 0.89 violates the
Taylor principle. Hence, the parameters in these columns generate indeterminacy while the
parameters in the last column do not.
(19)Similar results are obtained employing the mean.
(20)Notice that we impose the values obtained by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) for the matrix   M. The same exercise
performed with the   M matrix computed as suggested by the least-square criterion presented in the appendix does not
lead to any qualitative change.
184.2 The model-consistent IRFs and the SVARs
This section compares two different sets of IRFs following a monetary policy shock of the same
magnitude. The ﬁrst set represents the New Keynesian model-consistent reactions, which are the
impulse responses computed by solving the system (2) to (5). The second group of impulse
responses are generated using steps 1 to 4 of the algorithm above, and therefore correspond to the
estimates of the structural SVARs on the artiﬁcial series of the output gap, inﬂation and the
nominal interest rate generated by the model under indeterminacy and under determinacy. The
magnitude of the policy shock is, in both sets of IRFs, a one-standard-deviation of the structural
shock estimated using the SVAR on the artiﬁcial data.
The results under indeterminacy using the parameterisation labelled ‘Prior 1’ in Table 1 are shown
in the ﬁrst row of Figure 7. Solid lines represent the model-consistent IRFs while dotted lines
stand for the IRFs of the SVAR on artiﬁcial data. Several interesting results arise. First, the
model-consistent inﬂation reaction to the policy shock is negative on impact. After a few quarters,
this reaction becomes positive and reaches a peak at 24 basis points before converging smoothly to
the initial level. Not surprisingly, we obtain an inﬂation response which is very similar to the
response estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
The New Keynesian model is not capable of producing a price puzzle, though it is able to account
under indeterminacy for the inertia of inﬂation following a monetary policy shock. This suggests
that the results in Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), who ﬁnd that purely forward-looking models are not
capable of reproducing the persistent and hump-shaped responses to a monetary policy shock
observed in empirical VARs, may be attributed, at least for inﬂation, to limiting implicitly the
solution of the model to the determinacy region.
The inﬂation reaction from the recursive VAR on artiﬁcial data begins at zero by construction,
depicts a fairly steep curve that reaches its peak at about 50 basis points after a few quarters and
then starts to converge towards the steady state. After only 15 quarters, the behaviour of the two
responses is virtually indistinguishable. The VAR evidence is therefore qualitatively in line with
the predictions of the model-consistent IRFs but it shows a sizable, though gradually declining,
upward bias.
19The reaction of the federal funds rate to a policy shock is reported in the third column. The
estimated interest rate response from the SVAR on simulated data is shifted outward relative to the
response implied by the New Keynesian model. This is likely to reﬂect the fact that, because of
the inﬂation IRF bias, the systematic component of monetary policy responds to a higher level of
inﬂation in the recursive VAR on simulated data. In contrast, the response of the output gap is
fairly in line with the structural model with the sole exception, by construction, of the zero
contemporaneous restriction imposed in the SVAR. Indeterminacy in this model thus mostly
inﬂuences the persistence of inﬂation and the interest rate, whereas it does not seem to inﬂuence
much the persistence of the output gap response (see also Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)).
The solution of the model under determinacy returns two sets of IRFs that are virtually
indistinguishable. The New Keynesian model suggests that following a policy rate shock the price
level initially decreases 70 basis points. After a few periods below zero, however, inﬂation returns
to its steady-state value reﬂecting the lack of endogenous inﬂation persistence in the model. The
response of the output gap and inﬂation in the estimated VAR are different, by construction, in the
contemporaneous period only while the response of the policy rate effectively tracks the
model-consistent IRF at all periods.
Figure 8 presents the results using the parameterisation labelled ‘Prior 2’ in Table 1. In general,
the responses of all variables to a monetary policy shock bear out qualitatively the responses in
Figure 7. The inﬂation reaction under indeterminacy displayed in the middle panel of the ﬁrst row
shows, however, an important quantitative difference. The gap between the model-consistent
prediction and the response from the recursive VAR is far larger than the gap obtained using the
previous parameterisation. In particular, the maximum inﬂation differential is about 40 basis
points as opposed to the 16 basis points under Prior 1. Furthermore, the gap begins to shrink after
a few quarters but it does not disappear, even after 20 periods. A similar result emerges about the
policy rate response shown in the last column. The distance between the two lines is clearly larger
under Prior 2. In contrast, the output gap reacts similarly under the two parameterisations.
When monetary policy is active and therefore the solution of the LRE model is unique, the
responses in the second row of Figure 8 are virtually identical to the responses in the second row
of Figure 7. This suggests that two alternative parameterisations, as those used in this paper, do
not return any notable distinction as long as the expectations of inﬂation and the output gap are
20well anchored by an active monetary policy. In contrast, different values of the structural
parameters may play a quantitatively important role when monetary policy does not raise the
nominal interest rate sufﬁciently in response to a rise in inﬂation and hence induces indeterminacy.
The ﬁrst and second row of Figure 9 are obtained using the sign restrictions described above and
the data simulated by the sticky price model under indeterminacy and determinacy. In line with
the results from the recursive identiﬁcation, the price puzzle emerges in Panel A only when
monetary policy is passive. Furthermore, the inﬂation response in the ﬁrst row reveals that
relaxing the contemporaneous zero restrictions actually ampliﬁes the ‘price puzzle’ with respect to
Figure 8. This evidence corroborates the view that the bias of the structural VARs, relative to the
model, is not due to the identiﬁcation strategy. Under determinacy, which corresponds to a case
where the VAR is correctly speciﬁed and thus the policy shock is correctly identiﬁed, the IRFs of
the VAR based on sign restrictions track quite closely those of the New Keynesian model and the
price puzzle does not materialise.(21)
4.3 A cautionary digression on identiﬁcation
This section tries to shed new light on the conﬂicting results coming from two strands of the
empirical literature which attribute the great moderation observed since the beginning of the 1980s
to good policy and good luck, respectively.
A main contribution of this paper is to show that when the data are drawn from the indeterminacy
region the inﬂation response to a monetary policy shock in structural VARs is severely biased on
impact.T h i sﬁnding suggests that under indeterminacy a SVAR in the output gap, inﬂation and
interest rate is insufﬁcient to capture the dynamics of the underlying economy: the estimated
contemporaneous positive reaction of inﬂation appears spurious and it is due to a speciﬁcation
error induced by a passive monetary policy.(22)
This result has an important implication for the ability of structural VARs to identify the
determinants of speciﬁc historical episodes like the 1970s. When monetary policy is passive and
(21)A recent paper by Fry and Pagan (2005) points out that the impulse responses computed via sign restrictions may
be severely biased due to the possible mis-identiﬁcation of the structural shocks. Interestingly, the comparison of our
model-consistent responses to the VAR ones seems to support our identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock, at least
when pseudo-data and the determinacy scenario are taken into account.
(22)We return to this issue in Section 5.
21indeterminacy occurs, the misspeciﬁed VAR is not capable of distinguishing between a monetary
policy shock and a supply shock. In particular, Figure 9 reveals that the structural VAR favours an
identiﬁc a t i o nw h i c ha s s o c i a t e sam o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c kw i t hanon-positive output response and a
non-negative inﬂation response. These restrictions however characterise also a supply shock. This
implies that whenever the assumptions on the effects of monetary policy innovations are
inconsistent with those signs all the action induced by passive monetary policy is (incorrectly)
identiﬁed as supply shocks in the empirical model.(23)
This identiﬁcation problem can also explain why the empirical contributions that neglect
indeterminacy tend to attribute the great moderation to a signiﬁcant decline in the magnitude of
supply shocks. Moreover, our results provide formal support for the Bernanke (2004) conjecture
that ‘changes in inﬂation expectations, which are ultimately the product of the monetary policy
regime, can also be confused with truly exogenous shocks in conventional econometric analysis’.
4.4 Replicating the price puzzle
The New Keynesian model is never capable of generating a price puzzle. In contrast, the recursive
VAR on the simulated series is, under both parameterisations, capable of generating a sizable
positive response of inﬂa t i o no ni m p a c t .
The middle panel of Figure 10 brings together the inﬂation responses to a monetary policy shock
estimated on actual and simulated data. All estimates are based on a recursive tri-variate VAR in
output gap, inﬂation and interest rates. Dotted lines represent 95% conﬁdence interval of the VAR
e s t i m a t e do na c t u a ld a t ai nF i g u r e3a n dt h e ya r er e ported here for expositional convenience. Stars
(circles) represent the prediction of the SVAR on data simulated under Prior 1 (Prior 2). The two
impulse responses computed on the simulated data effectively track the response estimated on
actual data and furthermore they fall within the 95% bands at all periods. Moreover, the IRFs
obtained using artiﬁcial data reproduce the peak in the third quarter observed in the estimates on
actual data. The simulations deliver a more persistent path for the inﬂation response, albeit the
difference is not implausible, especially taking sampling uncertainty into account.
A similar picture emerges from the policy rate reactions in the right panel. The SVARs using data
(23)We are grateful to Tim Cogley for bringing this point to our attention.
22generated from the New Keynesian model (2)-(5) produce responses that for magnitude and
persistence are consistent with the results on actual data. The left panel shows however that the
model is less successful in reproducing the persistence of the output response. The next section
explores whether habit formation can explain this difference.(24)
4.5 Habit formation
This section performs an important robustness check by introducing habit formation into the
speciﬁcation of aggregate demand. This modiﬁcation serves two purposes. The ﬁrst purpose is to
explore whether the results in the previous section may be overturned when an additional source
of persistence is added to the model. The second goal is to investigate whether a richer
speciﬁcation can improve upon the model (2)-(5) in terms of the persistence of the output response
to a policy shock.
Several recent contributions suggest that the aggregate demand relation may be better described as
a convex combination of future realisations and past observations of the output gap. Söderlind,
Söderström, and Vredin (2005) ﬁnd that to ﬁt the US facts, the New Keynesian model needs a
large forward-looking component in the determination of output. In contrast, the results in Estrella
and Fuhrer (2002) and Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) suggest the backward-looking term is
dominant. Further evidence is provided in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Ireland (2005) who
estimate a New Keynesian model with habit formation and price indexation and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
role for the former but none for the latter. In order to capture the suggestions from these
contributions, we modify the IS curve as follows:
xt = ωxEtxt+1 + (1 − ωx)xt−1 − τ(Rt − Etπt+1) + gt (6)
and repeat the algorithm in Section 5 using the parameters in Table 2 and the model (3)-(5),(6).
The parameter ωx is set to 0.50, which broadly falls in the range of estimates reported in the
contributions quoted above. The results are presented in Figure 11.
(24)A comparison of the second row of Figures 7 and 8 with the second row of Figure 3 reveals that over the ﬁrst
three quarters the baseline model solved under determinacy is less successful in replicating the empirical IRF of
output gap, inﬂation and interest rate estimated over the post-1979 sample. Interestingly, we notice that the SVAR on
data simulated under determinacy produces IRFs that always fall in the empirical 95% conﬁdence intervals only when
the data generating process is characterised by persistent shocks to the IS equation. This observation calls for a deeper
investigation of the relative contributions of endogenous and exogenous persistence to the aggregate ﬂuctuations in
the post-1979 US economy. We leave this topic for future research.
23The output gap response now shows a higher persistence relative to the IRF in Figure 11. In
particular, it returns to its equilibrium value after 10 quarters, as opposed to 3 quarters in the
purely forward-looking speciﬁcation. Habit formation does not seem to improve signiﬁcantly the
statistical ﬁt of the impulse response on output from the simulated VAR, and most importantly
does not overturn the results on the inﬂation and interest rate responses. Furthermore, the latter
IRFs easily fall within the empirical 95% conﬁdence bands for most quarters.
5 Interpreting the subsample stylised fact
This section explores the source of the bias in the SVARs and assesses the extent to which
misspeciﬁcation can account for the price puzzle observed during the passive monetary policy
regimes. Given that our simulations produce very similar results setting sunspot ﬂuctuations to
zero at all times, the hypothesis that this type of shock is responsible for the price puzzle is
discarded from the set of candidate explanations.
5.1 The role of the omitted variable in the SVAR
In the simpler case where the central bank does not smooth the nominal interest rate (ρR = 0), the
three-equation New Keynesian model can be solved analytically. Under determinacy the dynamics
of the economy only depend on fundamentals and it is possible to re-write the output gap, inﬂation
a n di n t e r e s tr a t ee q u a t i o n sa saf u n ction of the structural shocks only. Under indeterminacy, in
contrast, the transmission of structural shocks is altered and the system is augmented with a latent
variable which is not present in the unique rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) show that when monetary policy is passive the evolution of the




















where w1,t−1 is a latent variable that follows the AR(1) process w1,t = λ1w1,t−1 + qt.T h e
coefﬁcient λ1 is the stable eigenvalue of the system (2)-(5), the innovation qt is a combination of
structural and sunspot shocks while  INDand ϒ a r em a t r i c e so fc o n v o l u t i o n so ft h ep a r a m e t e r so f
the model.
24This simple example discloses three important insights. First, a tri-variate VAR in the output gap,
inﬂation and nominal interest rate is misspeciﬁed when the data are generated according to a New
Keynesian model and the monetary policy rule violates the Taylor Principle. Second, the
misspeciﬁcation is induced by monetary policy and comes in the form of an omitted variable.
Third, the passive monetary policy rule generates ‘extra’ dynamics with respect to the regime
associated with an active policy rule.(25) While it is not possible to derive an explicit mapping
between the series of w1,t−1 and each variable in the system, it is worth exploring the extent to
which, under indeterminacy, expected inﬂation and the expected output gap embed information
about the monetary policy regime beyond the interest rate, inﬂation and the output gap.
Figure 12 plots the response of the output gap, inﬂation and interest rate from two augmented
four-variate recursive VARs where expected inﬂation and the expected output gap, Etzt+1,a r e ,i n
turn, ordered ﬁrst in the vector of series ˜ Yt =
 
Etzt+1, yt,πt, Rt
   generated from the baseline
New Keynesian model. The IRFs are shown for the indeterminacy solution as the omitted variable
problem is present in this case only. For the sake of comparison, the corresponding impulse
response functions from the tri-variate VAR in Figure 4 are reproduced as dotted lines. The IRFs
using the four-variate VAR augmented with expected inﬂation (output gap) are displayed as
pentagrams (stars).
T h ep e n t a g r a m st r a c kt h eI R F so ft h es t r u c t u r a lmodel (solid lines) remarkably well and the price
puzzle bias appears simply to vanish. Furthermore, a comparison with the dotted lines from the
tri-variate VAR reveals that controlling for expected inﬂation accounts on its own for virtually all
the omitted variable bias that is behind the price puzzle detect e db yt h es t r u c t u r a lV A R s . (26) In
contrast, augmenting the VAR with expected output gap produces responses which are on impact
little changed, especially for inﬂation, relative to the IRFs from the tri-variate speciﬁcation in
interest rate, the output gap and inﬂation only.
(25)The solution of a linear rational expectations model requires that all unstable roots of the system be suppressed.
The New Keynesian model used in this paper is characterised by two roots. When monetary policy conforms to the
Taylor Principle the two roots are unstable, ie the system is determinate, and the solution generates no ‘extra’
persistence relative to the speciﬁcation of the model. In contrast, indeterminacy is characterised by only one unstable
root, thereby implying that the solution now generates additional dynamics through the stable root.
(26)The residual discrepancy between the IRFs of the four-variate SVAR and the IRFs of the DSGE model in Figure
12, while negligible relative to the case without inﬂation expectations (dotted line), is likely due to other factors we do
not control for. These factors include the contemporaneous zero restrictions and the omission of the output gap
expectations in the SVAR. The result in Figure 12 however suggests that these alternative explanations are likely to
play only a minor role.
25This ﬁnding qualiﬁes and extends Sims’ conjecture about the mis-identiﬁcation of the policy
shock in a misspeciﬁed VAR. In particular, expected inﬂation matters not only for the ability of
VARs to predict future inﬂation but also, more importantly, for their ability to mimic the latent
variable that arises under indeterminacy only. Our results therefore also provide a rationale for the
ﬁn d i n gi nB e r n a n k e ,B o i v i na n dE l i a s z( 2 0 0 5 )t h at the inclusion of a latent factor (ordered ﬁrst) in
an otherwise standard three-variate recursive VAR can sensibly reduce the price puzzle over the
full postwar sample. A similar result can be found in Kozicki and Tinsley (2003) using a
time-varying model.
5.2 Assessing the impact of the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation forecasts
The previous results pose an important empirical question: ‘what macroeconomic series can
approximate in practice the latent variable induced by a passive monetary policy?’. The New
Keynesian model used in this paper suggests that the latent variable is indeed a product of the
passive monetary policy regime. Equation (7) reveals that whenever the latent variable is omitted
from the VAR, the identiﬁcation of the structural shocks is invalid in that, for instance, the
innovations to the interest rate equation are not anymore truly exogenous; rather they are a
convolution of the monetary policy shock and a speciﬁcation error.
And, by neglecting this misspeciﬁcation, the incorrectly identiﬁed policy shock has indeed, in
Bernanke’s words, the ﬂavor of an adverse supply shock in that, as shown in Figures 7 and 8, it
moves inﬂation and output in opposite directions. Under determinacy, in contrast, the monetary
policy shock is correctly identiﬁed and, in line with the theory, it causes inﬂation and output to
move in the same direction. Furthermore, the inclusion of expected inﬂation in the model-based
SVAR in Figure 12 appears to account for most of the omitted variable bias in the responses of
inﬂation and interest rate.
This evidence suggests a simple empirical test on the ability of expected inﬂa t i o nt oa p p r o x i m a t e
the theoretical latent variable. This test consists of using the Federal Reserve’s information on
future inﬂation in the SVAR on actual data. This information is contained in the ‘Green book’, an
extensive and detailed analysis of the US and world economy pr e p a r e db yt h eF e ds t a f fb e f o r ee a c h
meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee. The forecasts from the Green book are published
with a ﬁve years lag. Were the Federal Reserve’s expectations on future inﬂation quantitatively
26important, we should observe a signiﬁcant reduction of the price puzzle on actual data.
To explore this hypothesis, we then run two four-variate structural VARs on actual data using the
two identiﬁcation strategies based on the contemporaneous zero restrictions and the sign
restrictions employed in the empirical section. For the recursive (lower-triangular) identiﬁcation,
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represents the one quarter ahead inﬂation forecasts from the Green book.(27) W ef o c u so nt h i st i m e
series because one quarter ahead is the relevant horizon to forecast inﬂation in the New Keynesian
m o d e lu s e di nt h i sp a p e r . (28)
It is worth emphasising that we are interested in isolating the effect of a monetary policy shock,
and thus using the inﬂation predictions from the Board of Governors is likely to improve the
identiﬁcation of the systematic component of monetary policy. The Green book forecasts
presumably include information from a wide range of sources including the policymakers’
judgement. To the extent that the forecasts produced by commercial agencies are less broad in
scope and sources, using alternative forecasts could lead us to mismeasuring the monetary policy
shock in the structural VAR.(29)
Figure 13 plots the results over the subsample 1968 Q3-1979 Q3. The left panel refers to the
estimates based on zero restrictions while the right panel corresponds to the sign restrictions
identiﬁcation strategy. We are interested in comparing the performance of the augmented SVAR
relative to the solid line, which represents the IRF from the tri-variate SVAR on actual data using
the output gap, inﬂation and interest rate only.
Two results stand out. First, as suggested by the indeterminacy induced omitted variable bias
(27)In estimating the SVAR we are implicitly assuming that the identiﬁed policy shock is contemporaneously
uncorrelated with the Green book forecasts. On the basis of an extensive VAR literature however, we also impose that
inﬂation and real activity respond to changes in policy with some lags only. Moreover, the results from our SVAR are
robust to using the current-quarter and the two quarter ahead Green book forecasts. Altogether, this suggest that our
estimates should not suffer an endogeneity problem. Finally, we obtain very similar results imposing the additional
restriction that the interest rate responds contemporaneously to either the Green book forecasts or to current inﬂation.
(28)Sample availability is another reason for focusing on the one quarter ahead inﬂation forecasts. In fact, this series
begins in 1968 Q3, and it is among the longest available predictions. Our results are robust to using both the two
quarter ahead inﬂation forecasts, which begin in 1968 Q4, and the current-quarter forecasts, which begin in 1967 Q4.
By contrast, the series of the one year ahead inﬂation expectations is available since 1974 Q2, which limits
considerably the case for a reliable subsample investigation.
(29)Romer and Romer (2000) argue convincingly that the Green book forecasts do have a superior historical
performance in forecasting inﬂation relative to the private sector forecasts.
27hypothesis, the ‘incorrectly identiﬁed’ policy shock from the tri-variate SVAR produces an
inﬂation response (solid line) that over the ﬁr s tn i n eq u a r t e r si ss i g n i ﬁcantly above the IRF from
the ‘correctly identiﬁed’ four-variate augmented SVARs (solid line with squares). Second, while
t h ez e r oi si n s i d et h el o w e ra nd upper percentiles over the ﬁrst few periods, the identiﬁcation based
on sign restrictions, which does not impose any zero on impact, delivers now a negative point
estimate for the contemporaneous response of inﬂa t i o na so p p o s e dt ot h epositive 1.2 response
estimated under the tri-variate SVAR in Figure 5. This suggests that expected inﬂation is indeed
empirically important in this subsample, and that this result is robust to two different identiﬁcation
strategies.
Interestingly, adding expected inﬂation to the SVAR estimated over the subsample 1979 Q4-1999
Q4 produces IRFs, not reported and available upon request, that are virtually identical to the IRFs
from the estimated tri-variate SVAR in the output gap, inﬂation and federal funds rate only. We
thus conclude that only when monetary policy is passive, and therefore expectations are not well
anchored, are inﬂation expectations very informative about the dynamics of the economy. In
particular, expected inﬂation helps to identify correctly a monetary policy shock.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the empirical level, it shows that the price puzzle is a
subsample regularity of the periods that, in the empirical literature on monetary policy rules, are
typically associated with a weak interest rate response to inﬂation. These are the years prior to the
appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in August 1979 for the United States and the period
prior to the introduction of the inﬂation-targeting framework in October 1992 for the United
Kingdom. The ﬁnding is robust to augmenting the VAR with unit labour costs, commodity price
index and M2. The VAR evidence presented in this paper is new because it is obtained using two
different identiﬁcation strategies based on zero restrictions and sign restrictions, and because it is
shown to hold independently from the measure of real activity and the measure of inﬂation used.
At the theoretical level, this paper employs a popular New Keynesian sticky price model of the US
economy to investigate whether indeterminacy, as induced by a passive monetary policy, can
account quantitatively for the price puzzle observed during the pre-1979 period. Although
previous research has proposed a number of helpful strategies to control for this price anomaly in
28the data, this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst theoretically and empirically
consistent attempt to rationalise the price puzzle using a structural model.
On the basis of Montecarlo simulations, we argue that the price puzzle in the SVARs is spurious
because neither under determinacy nor under indeterminacy the theoretical model produces on
impact a positive inﬂation response to a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, we show that the
price puzzle is due to the omission of a latent variable capturing the ‘extra’ dynamics that
characterise the New Keynesian model under indeterminacy only. Expected inﬂation is found to
approximate this omitted latent variable reasonably well, both in the theory and in the data. Our
results thus formally support Bernanke (2004) conjecture that in speciﬁc historical periods
changes in inﬂation expectations are essential for identifying truly structural shocks.
The New Keynesian model used in this paper, while widely employed for monetary policy
analysis, is highly stylised. Indeed, the link between the degree of activism in the policy rule and
multiple equilibria may be far more complex than a simple three-equation system could capture.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the empirical relevance of
equilibrium indeterminacy using larger models of the business cycle where monetary aggregates
and the exchange rate are also fully speciﬁed. It may well be the case that the explanation
proposed in this paper could also account for other long-standing puzzles in macroeconomics.
29Data appendix
The US data were collected in March 2004 from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. The UK data were collected in November 2004 from the Bank of England. The inﬂation
rate, πt, is the quarter-to-quarter annualised growth rate of the price index. The output gap, xt is
computed as either the difference between potential output and RGDP or as a ﬁltered RGDP. The
two ﬁlters used are the ﬁl t e r sp r o p o s e db yH o d r i c ka n dP r e s c ott and a quadratic trend. Monthly
series are transformed in quarterly series by taking end-of-quarter observations. Log levels of all
variables (except the policy rates, the output gap measures, and the inﬂation rates) are used in the
estimations.
US data
GDP Deﬂator: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator. Seasonally adjusted. Index
2000=100. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
CPI: Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items. Seasonally adjusted. Index
1996=100. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PPI: Production Price Index: Industrial Commodities. Index 2000=100. Seasonally adjusted.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PPI: Production Price Index: Crude Fuel. Index 1982=100. Seasonally adjusted. Source: Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
PPI: Production Price Index: Crude Materials. Index 1982=1000. Seasonally adjusted. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
OILPRICE: Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate. Seasonally adjusted. Source: Wall Street
Journal / Haver Analytics.
G r e e nb o o kE x p e c t e dI n ﬂation: Green book forecasts (1 and 2 quarters ahead) for the GNP/GDP
price level, quarter-by-quarter growth rate, annualised. Source: Federal Reserve Board of
Governors.
Capacity Utilization Rate: Total Industry (percent of capacity). Seasonally adjusted. Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System G.17
ULC: Nonfarm Business sector unit labor costs. Seasonally adjusted. Index 1992=100. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Potential Output: Congressional Budget Ofﬁce estimate. Chained 2000 $. Source: CBO.
30RGDP: Real Gross Domestic Products, 3 Decimal. Chained 2000 $. Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
FFR: Effective Federal Funds Rate. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
H.15
M2: M2 Money Stock. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System H.3
UK data
GDP Deﬂator: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator. Seasonally adjusted. Index
2001=100. Source: Ofﬁce for National Statistics.
CPI: Consumer Prices Index: All Items. Seasonally adjusted. Index 1996=100. Source: Ofﬁce for
National Statistics.
ULC: Business sector unit labour costs. Computed as whole-economy unit labour costs excluding
government sector and including government procurements from the private sector. Seasonally
adjusted. Index 2001=100. Source: Bank of England calculations on ONS series.
R G D P :R e a lG r o s sD o m e s t i cP r o d u cts. Chained 2001 £. Source: Ofﬁce for National Statistics.
Policy rate: Bank’s repo rate (policy rate before 1997). Source: Bank of England.
31Appendix: Solution of the canonical LRE model
The linear rational expectations model described by equations (2) to (5) can be cast in the
following canonical form:
 0(θ)st =  1(θ)st−1 +  (θ)εt +  (θ)ηt (B-1)
where the vector st = [xt,πt, Rt, Etxt+1, Etπt+1]  collects the n variables of the system,
εt = [εR,t,gt,ut]  is the vector of l fundamental shocks, ηt = [(xt − Et−1xt),(πt − Et−1πt)] 
collects the k rational expectations forecast errors, and θ = [ψπ,ψx,ρR,β,,κ,τ,σR,σg,σu]i s
the vector of the parameters of the model outlined in the previous section.
In order to transform the canonical form and solve the model, we follow Sims (2001) and exploit
the generalised complex Schur decomposition (QZ) of the matrices  0 and  1. This corresponds
to computing the matrices Q, Z,   and   such that QQ  = ZZ  = In,   and   are upper
triangular,  0 = Q  Z and  1 = Q  Z.D e ﬁning wt = Z st and pre-multiplying (B-1) by Q,w e
obtain:
⎡























⎦( εt +  ηt) (B-2)
where, without loss of generality, the vector of generalised eigenvalues λ, which is the vector of
the ratios between the diagonal elements of   and  , has been partitioned such that the lower
block collects all the explosive eigenvalues. The matrices  ,   and Q have been partitioned
accordingly, and therefore Q j. collects the blocks of rows that correspond to the stable (j = 1)
and unstable (j = 2) eigenvalues respectively.
The explosive block of (B-2) can be rewritten as:(30)
w2,t =  
−1
22  22w2,t−1 +  
−1
22 Q2.( εt +  ηt) (B-3)
Given the set of m equations (B-3), a non-explosive solution of the linear rational expectations
model (B-1) for st requires w2,t = 0 ∀t ≥ 0. T h i sc a nb eo b t a i n e db ys e t t i n gw2,0 = 0a n d
choosing for every vector εt the endogenous forecast error ηt that satisﬁes the following condition
Q2.( εt +  ηt) = 0 (B-4)
(30)It is possible to have some zero-elements on the main diagonal of  22. In this case, the latter matrix is not
invertible. The ‘solving-forward’ solution proposed by Sims (2001) and extended by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
overcomes this problem. A technical appendix with a more detailed discussion of the solution strategy is available
from the authors upon request.
32A general stable solution for the endogenous forecast error can be computed through a singular
value decomposition of Q2.        
mxk
= U     
mxm




    
kxk
= U.1     
mxr




.1     
rxk
,w h e r eD11 is a diagonal matrix
and D and U are orthonormal matrices. Using this decomposition, Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)





11 U.1Q2.  + V.2   M)εt + V.2ζt (B-5)
where   M is the (k −r)xl matrix governing the inﬂuence of the sunspot shock on the model
dynamics.
Assuming that  
−1
0 exists, the solution (B-5) can be combined with (B-1) to yield the following
law of motion for the state vector:










.1Q2.  +  
∗V.2   M
 
εt +  
∗V.2ζt (B-6)
where a generic X∗ =  
−1
0 X.
In general, we can be confronted with three cases. If the number of endogenous forecast errors k is
equal to the number of non-zero singular values r, the system is determined and the stability
condition (B-4) uniquely determines ηt. In such a case, V.2 = 0, then the last two addends of (B-6)
drop out. This implies that the dynamics of st is purely a function of the structural parameters θ.
If the number of endogenous forecast errors k exceeds the number of non-zero singular values r,
the system is indeterminate and sunspot ﬂuctuations can arise. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)
show that this can inﬂuence the solution along two dimensions. First, sunspot ﬂuctuations ζt can
affect the equilibrium dynamics. Second, the transmission of fundamental shocks εt is no longer
uniquely identiﬁed as the elements of   M are not pinned down by the structure of the linear rational
expectations model.
Alternatively, the number of endogenous forecast errors k can be smaller than the number of
non-zero singular values r, and then the system has no solutions. These three conditions
generalise the procedure in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) of counting the number of unstable roots
and predetermined variables.(31)
In order to compute   M and then the solutions of the model under indeterminacy, it is necessary to
(31)The solution method proposed by Sims (2001) has the advantage that it does not require the separation of
predetermined variables from ‘jump’ variables. Rather, it recognises that in equilibrium models expectational
residuals are attached to equations and that the structure of the coefﬁcient matrices in the canonical form implicitly
selects the linear combination of variables that needs to be predetermined for a solution to exist.
33impose some additional restrictions on the endogenous forecast errors. Following Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004), we choose   M such that the impulse responses
∂st
∂ε 
t associated with the system
(B-6) are continuous at the boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy region. This
solution is labelled ‘continuity’.(32)
Let  I and  D be the sets of all possible vectors of parameters θ s in the indeterminacy and
determinacy region respectively. For every vector θ ∈  I we identify a corresponding vector
∼
θ ∈  D that lies on the boundary of the two regions and choose   M such that the response of st to
εt conditional on θ mimics the response conditional on
∼





(θ) = B1(θ) + B2(θ) =  





.1Q2.  +  
∗V.2   M (B-7)




(  θ)= B1(  θ) (B-8)
Applying a least-square criterion, we can then compute









B1(  θ)− B1(θ)
 
(B-9)
and use (B-9) to calculate the solution of the model in (B-5) and (B-6).(33)
The new vector
∼
θ is obtained from θ by replacing ψπ with the condition that marks the boundary
between the determinacy and indeterminacy region in the system (2) to (4). Woodford (2003)
shows that this condition corresponds to the following interest rate reaction to inﬂation
  ψπ = 1 −
ψx
κ
(1 − β) (B-10)
(32)Alternatively, the solution of the model under indeterminacy can be computed using the assumption that the
effects of the sunspot shocks are orthogonal to the effects of the structural shocks. This identiﬁcation yields results,
not reported but available upon request, that are qualitatively similar to the ﬁndings for the continuity case.
(33)Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) notice that this way of computing the vector   M relates to the search for the
minimal-state-variable solution advocated by McCallum (1983), ie the most meaningful solution from an economic
perspective among the n-possible ones under indeterminacy.
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38Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameters Indeterminacy Prior 1 Indeterminacy Prior 2 Determinacy
ψπ 0.77 0.89 2.19
ψx 0.17 0.15 0.30
ρR 0.60 0.53 0.84
β 0.99 0.99
Prior 1/Prior 2
κ 0.77 0.75 0.77/0.75
τ−1 1.45 2.08 1.45/2.08
σ R 0.23 0.24 0.23/0.24
σ g 0.27 0.21 0.27/0.21
σ z 1.13 1.16 1.13/1.16
σξ 0.20 0.23 0.20/0.23
Note: The parameterisation of the data generating process is borrowed from Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004), Table 3. Prior 1 (2) corresponds to the set of estimated values they obtain
under their ﬁrst (second) Prior. The indeterminacy solution uses the estimates of the M matrix in
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), ie [MRξ, Mgξ, Muξ] = [-0.68 1.74 –0.69].













Note: see Table 1.
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Response of FFR to a MP Shock
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in Real GDP, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. Identification 
achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorisation of the variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines 
are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands (analytical). Number of lags selected 
according to standard statistical lag-length criteria.   42
 
Figure 3. GDP Deflator Inflation Reaction to a Monetary Policy Shock:  
Sub-sample Analysis with Different Business-cycle Measures 
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Response of GDP DEFL. INFLATION to a MP shock
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in a business-cycle measure, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. The 
business cycle measures are, left to right: CBO-based output gap, HP-filtered output gap and quadratically 
detrended output gap. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorisation of the 
variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands 
(analytical). Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria.   43
Figure 4. GDP Deflator Inflation Reaction to a Monetary Policy Shock:  
Robustness Analysis with an Expanded Vector of Endogenous Variables  
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Response of GDP DEFL. INFLATION to a MP shock
 
Note: Augmented VARs using ‘additional variable/s’, CBO-based output gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. The ‘additional variable/s’ 
are: real unit labour costs in the first column, PPI in the second column, M2 in the third column, and both M2 and PPI in the fourth column (all in logs, 
multiplied by 100). The Structural VARs in the first two and last columns use a recursive identification schemes whereas the third column employs the 
ordering [∆M2t xt πt it]’ with the following zero restrictions on A=[α11 α12 0 α14; 0 α22 0 0; 0 α32 α33 0; α41 α42 α43 α44]) in v=A-1u. Solid lines are point 
estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands (analytical). Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria.   44







Response of Output Gap to a MP Shock
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Figure 5. IRFs to a Monetary Policy Shock: Sub-sample Analysis 






























Note: Tri-variate VAR in CBO output gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. Identification 
based on the sign restrictions reported in Table 3. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% 
confidence bands. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria. 
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Figure 6. Inflation Reaction to a Monetary Policy Shock – UK data:  
Sub-sample Analysis with Different Measures of Inflation and Real Activity 
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Response of CPI INFLATION to a MP Shock
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in a measure of real activity, a measure of inflation, and the nominal interest rate. The measures of real activity are, left to right: real 
GDP, HP-filtered output gap, quadratically detrended output gap and HP-filtered output gap (all in logs, multiplied by 100). The measure of inflation is 
the GDP deflator for all columns but the last one, which uses the CPI. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorisation of the 
variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands (analytical). Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag-length criteria.   46
Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
Structural Model vs. Structural VAR on simulated data - PRIOR 1 
 



















Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural 
VAR on simulated data. The data generating process is the New Keynesian model in the 
main text parameterised according to Prior 1 in Table 1. The point estimates of the 
Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated 
sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of 
stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower 
triangular) factorisation of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: 
output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag length criteria.   47
Figure 8. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
Structural Model vs. Structural VAR on simulated data - PRIOR 2 
 


















Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural 
VAR on simulated data. The data generating process is the New Keynesian model in the 
main text parameterised according to Prior 2 in Table 1. The point estimates of the 
Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated 
sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of 
stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower 
triangular) factorisation of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: 
output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag length criteria. 
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Figure 9. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
Structural Model vs. Structural VAR on simulated data - PRIOR 2 
 
Identification Based on Sign Restrictions 
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Panel B: Determinacy
Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural VAR on simulated 
data. The data generating process is the New Keynesian model in the main text parameterised 
according to Prior 2 in Table 1. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data are 
based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and 
then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification based on the sign 
restrictions reported in the main text. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag 
length criteria.   49
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actual data confidence bounds
simulated SVAR under Prior 1
simulated SVAR under Prior 2
Figure 10. Comparison of Estimated and Simulated  















Note: Tri-variate VAR in output gap, inflation rate, and federal funds rate. Solid and dash-dotted lines refer 
to the structural VAR estimated on actual data (mean and 95% analytical confidence bands). Circles and 
stars refer to the structural VAR estimated on simulated data. Identification achieved through a Cholesky 
(lower triangular) factorisation of the variance-covariance matrix. Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag-length criteria. 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of Estimated and Simulated  
Impulse Response Function to a Monetary Policy Shock: Model with Habit Formation 
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in output gap, inflation rate, and federal funds rate. Solid and dash-dotted lines 
refer to the structural VAR estimated on actual data (mean and 95% analytical confidence bands). 
Diamonds refer to the structural VAR estimated on data simulated from a model with habit formation. 
Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorisation of the variance-covariance 
matrix. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria. 
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Figure 12. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
The Role of the Omitted Variable under Indeterminacy 
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Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on 
simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra 
observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. 
Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorisation of the variance-
covariance matrix using the following ordering: expected future inflation, output gap, inflation 
and nominal interest rate. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag length 
criteria. 
Figure 13. Comparison of the Inflation Responses to a Monetary Policy 
Shock from Estimated SVARs with and without the Green book 
Expected Inflation: pre-Volcker period 
Note: Four-variate VAR in one quarter ahead Green book expected inflation, CBO output gap, 
GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. Solid lines with squares are median estimates, dotted 
lines are upper and lower error bands computed as in previous figures. Number of lags selected 
according to standard statistical lag-length criteria. 